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During the 17th century, mathematics changed deeply. As it has often been remarked, this
went together with a new methodological or, rather, a new philosophical attitude. Never-
theless, in the 17th century, philosophy of mathematics was not just a marginal effect or an
implicit and, of course, partial cause of a broad transformation of mathematics itself. It was
also a domain of research and the subject of controversies and intellectual disputes; in short,
an autonomous discipline1. Of course, the internal evolution of such a discipline could not re-
main completely unaffected by the contemporary evolution of mathematics. Still, many of the
topics that constituted its specific content were intrinsically dependent on traditional quarrels
and quite old questions. One of these topics was concerned with the mutual relations and the
opposite virtues of arithmetic and geometry. Though inherited from the traditional distinc-
tion of quantities in the opposite genera of numbers (or discrete quantities) and magnitudes
(or continuous quantities), this question appeared in a new light because of the impressive
disclosure of new algebraic techniques to be applied both to numbers and magnitudes.
Isaac Barrow and John Wallis, the most prominent and innovative British mathemati-
cians of their time, devoted much of their intellectual energy to such a topic, arguing for two
diametrically opposite views. Barrow’s Lectiones Mathematicæ2 and Wallis’s Mathesis uni-
∗The material discussed in the present paper was first presented at the HOPOS conference held in Paris, on
June 2006, during a joint talk with Antoni Malet. I thank Antoni Malet himself and David Rabouin for having
drawn my attention to this material and for the many instructive discussions of it and related subjects. I also
thank Michel Blay, Sara Confalonieri, Massimo Galuzzi, Daniel Garber, Niccolo`, Guicciardini, Doug Jesseph,
Vincent Jullien, Susan Klaiber, Paolo Mancosu, Se´bastien Maronne, and Theodora Seal, for valuable comments
on my talk and earlier versions of my paper. Many thanks also to Luigi Maieru` for several very stimulating
discussions about Barrow and Wallis, among other things.
1This view is, at least implicitly, endorsed in [30], [23], [31], and [17].
2Cf. [9] and [6]. Though published only in 1683, six years after Barrow’s death, this treatise includes
the lectures given by him at the University of Cambridge, as Lucasian professor of mathematics in 1664-1666
(the crucial years in the mathematical schooling of Newton: cf. [27], vol. I, and [28]). In 1734, an English
translation of it, due to J. Kirkby, was published: cf. [7]. I quote from this translation. A new edition of the
original Latin text is available in [8], pp. 1-378. Concerning the passages which are relevant for my purpose,
Kirkby’s translation is accurate enough. Thus, I’ll quote it, though pointing out some typographical errors,
and suggesting how to correct it in the few cases where it seems to me to differ considerably from the original.
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versalis and Algebra3 were quite elaborate treatises aiming to defend (according to different
methodological strategies) two opposite theses: the foundational superiority of geometry over
arithmetic and of arithmetic over geometry, respectively.
My aim is to discuss two examples that Barrow relies on in his lecture III. His conception
would of course deserve more attention and a much more detailed analysis4. Here I shall limit
myself to a very specific point, which I chose because it is very close to a topic discussed by
Jean in one of his papers which I particularly favor for both scientific and personal reasons5.
1 Barrow’s thesis about arithmetic and geometry
The following quotation, taken from the very beginning of lecture III, should suffice to point
out the thesis defended by Barrow in this lecture6:
[. . . ] I affirmed the Whole of Mathematics to be in some sort contained and cir-
cumscribed within the Bounds of Geometry. And indeed concerning the other
Sciences then mentioned, I imagine no Body will much deny, but they are conve-
niently enough reduced to Geometry. But now I have brought a harder Task upon
myself, to shew allowable and fit Causes for expunging Arithmetic out of the List
of Mathematical Sciences, and as it were degrading the most noble Science from
the Degree which it has been so long possessed of. [. . . ] Be it far from me to
take away or seclude a Science so excellent and profitable that of Numbers from
the Mathematics. I will rather restore it into its lawful Place, as being removed
out of its proper Seat, and ingraff and unite it again into its native Geometry, the
Stock from whence it has been plucked. [. . . ] For I am convinced that Number7
really differs nothing from what is called Continued Quantity, but is only formed
to express and declare it; and consequently that Arithmetic and Geometry are not
conversant about different Matters, but do both equally demonstrate Properties
3Cf. [41], [42] and [43].
4For a general description and an assessment of the whole treatise, cf. [18], pp. 181-202. The matter has
also been treated by: C. Sasaki—in the context of a study of the acceptance of the theory of proportion
in the 16th and 17th centuries [cf. [34]]—, H. Pycior—in the context of a reconstruction of the historical
setting for Berkeley’s views about mathematics [cf. [32], pp. 274-277]—, L. Maieru`—in the context of a general
reconstruction of the mathematical works of Barrow and Wallis [cf. [19]]—, K. Hill—in the context of a study
of Wallis’ and Barrow’s conceptions about the composition of continua [cf. [15]]—, A. Malet—in the context of
a comparison between Barrow’s and Wallis attitudes toward the method of indivisibles [cf. [21]] and in that of
a reconstruction of Barrow’s program of mathematization of natural philosophy [cf. [22]]—, and D. Jesseph—in
the context of the controversy between Hobbes and Wallis’ on the quadrature of circle.
5Cf. [11].
6Cf. [7], pp. 29-31.
7Kirkby’s translation omits here a relevant parenthesis: “(illum saltem quem Mathematicus contemplatur)”.
One could include it in the main statement thus: “For I am convinced that Number (at least in so far as it is
considered by a mathematician) really differs nothing. . . ”
2
common to one and the same Subject; and very many, and very great Improvement
will appear to be derived from hence upon the Republic of Mathematics.
I. For first of all it appears that there is neither any general Axiom nor par-
ticular Conclusion agreeing with Geometry (which respects Magnitudes not taken
absolutely, but in Comparison with one another according to certain Proportions
of Equality or Inequality, i. e. as they are capable of being designed and compared
together by Measures) but what by the same Reason also agrees with Arithmetic:
And on the other hand that nothing can be affirmed, concluded, or demonstrated,
concerning Numbers which may not in like manner be accommodated to Magni-
tudes; whence accrues a remarkable Light and vast Improvement to both Sciences;
the Cause being removed of superfluously repeating and demonstrating Theorems
by Nature altogether the same, also of often solving the same Problems.[. . . ]
II. This Coalition of Numbers and Magnitudes being admitted, a plentiful Ac-
cession accrues to each Discipline. For it will be a very easy thing to discover and
demonstrate very many Theorems concerning Numbers by the Assistance of Geom-
etry, which, by keeping within the common Limits of Arithmetic would scarcely,
if at all, be capable either of Investigation or Demonstration: Also very many
Things may be more briefly and clearly found out and demonstrated from hence.
And reciprocally, the Ratio’s or Reasons of Numbers being well understood will
communicate not a little to the more evident Explication and strong Confirmation
of many Geometrical Theorems.
To sum it up in Mahoney’s words8, Barrow’s thesis is that “the domain of arithmetic
[. . . ][is] subsumed under that of geometry”, or, as Jesseph says9, that “numbers, far from
being self-subsistent objects, are mere symbols whose content derives from their application
to continuous geometric magnitude”.
If we considered it in the light of the internal evolution of mathematics, this proposal—and
specially Barrow’s promise of a “great Improvement [. . . ] upon the Republic of Mathematics”
that should have been derived from the envisioned reduction of arithmetic to geometry—
would inevitably appear as completely out of place. It was made in spring 166410, more
than seventy years after Vie`te’s axiomatic definition of an algebraic formalism for any sort
of quantity11, almost thirty years after Descartes interpretation of this same formalism on
any sort of magnitude12, and on the immediate eve of Newton’s results that brought him to
the theory of fluxions13. These results did certainly not provide any argument to deny that
8Cf. [18], p. 188.
9Cf. [17], p. 33.
10Cf. [13], p. 68.
11Cf. [37], ch. 2.
12Cf. [10], pp. 297-298.
13Cf. [27], vol. I, parts I and II, and [28]. It is quite probable that Barrow’s lectures were published from
a manuscript that he had given to Collins in March 1668 [cf. [13], pp. 68-79; specially, p. 69.]. At that date,
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number “is only formed to express and declare” geometric magnitudes, that it merely results
from a way to speak of them. But, in the light of them, the essential question for the evolution
of mathematics could no more be that of the intrinsic nature of numbers and their relations
with magnitudes. Questions connected with the development of an appropriate formalism to
be used for treating both numbers and magnitudes became much more relevant, indeed.
Still, the right perspective in which Barrow’s proposals should be read is not that of the
evolution of mathematics. Barrow was rather looking for a way to found the new mathematical
results on the secure roots of the classical tradition. This is a twofold philosophical require-
ment: it is both a requirement of foundation and a requirement of tradition. Many historical
reasons could explain it. I merely suggest that it was such a double philosophical requirement
that commanded Barrow’s Lectiones Mathematicæ, and that it was for this reason that this
work is so profoundly involved with topics, arguments and rhetorical figures derived from the
Aristotelian philosophical repertory. This suggestion has a historiographical implication: the
program exposed in this work should not be understood as it were intended to promote some
sort of mathematical progress, and should not be judged on the basis of the natural criteria
used to judge a mathematical program. I guess that, mutatis mutandis, this is also the case
of the opposite program exposed in Wallis’ Mathesis universalis and Algebra.
The previous long passage that I have quoted from the third of Barrow’sMathematical Lectures
is followed by two examples that Barrow introduced without any foreword: “We will illustrate
the Matter with an Example or two”, he simply wrote14. Barrow provided, in each case, what
he considered to be a geometric incontestable proof of an arithmetical theorem, and pretended
that no equally exact or clear proof of these statements could be obtained by means of purely
arithmetic arguments15.
Barrow was certainly already aware of the results obtained by Newton between 1664 and 1666. And, though,
at that time, Newton had not yet coined the term “fluxion” and did not have such a general concept as that
which he designated with this term in the De methodis (composed in 1671), these results should have shown, to
any attentive interpreter, that the mathematical properties of quantities depended much less on their specific
nature than on their possible operational relations.
14Cf. [7], p. 31.
15The term “arithmetic” certainly did not have, in the middle of the 17th century, a fixed and univocal
meaning. It was used both in a strict sense, to refer to that part of mathematics that dealt with numbers
through the basic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and extractions of roots defined
on them, and in a broader sense, to refer to what was also termed, more precisely, “universal arithmetic”. The
term “algebra” was even more ambiguous. Very often, historians use it today—when speaking of early modern
mathematics—to refer to the same matter that the term “universal arithmetic” denoted in early modern age,
and this was also a common use at that time [about the notion of algebra in early modern age, cf. [29]]. It
follows that there is room, when early modern mathematics is concerned, to understand the terms “arithmetic”
and “algebra” as synonymous. It seems to me that this understanding does not apply to the case under
consideration, however. I rather suggest that in his third lecture, Barrow was using the former term in the first
of the two previous senses. At the end of his second lecture, he was, moreover, quite explicit in arguing that
algebra should be understood as “a Part or Species of Logic”, that is, as a “certain Manner of using Reason”,
and that, so understood, it could apply both to geometry and arithmetic [cf. [7], p. 28]. It seems thus that for
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The first example concerns a theorem that is actually very hard to prove in purely arith-
metical terms. Nevertheless, Barrow’s geometric proof depends on the supposition of a sort of
solidarity between arithmetic and geometry that—despite being clearly justified—could have
been understood, and actually had been understood by Wallis, as a symptom of a possible
reduction of geometric results to arithmetical ones, rather than viceversa. The theorem in-
volved in the second example admits, instead, a number of simple purely arithmetical proofs,
some of which were certainly known or could have been known (and understood) by Barrow.
Hence, were it judged on a purely mathematical basis, Barrow’s claim would appear in both
cases as highly questionable. If we are not ready to admit that Barrow’s examples have—and
also had, at Barrow’s time—no argumentative force, and simply reduce to rhetorical devices,
we have, thus, to offer a different interpretation of them.
I suggest that what Barrow was arguing for, through these examples, was not the greater
deductive power of geometry over arithmetic, but rather the foundational priority of a form of
infinity, quite naturally involved in geometric arguments, over another form of infinity, usually
involved, instead, in arithmetical arguments. In other words, I suggest that what Barrow was
implicitly maintaining, when he asserted that the theorems under consideration did not admit
a satisfactory purely arithmetical proof, was that such a proof would in any case be grounded
on some infinitary arguments that should have not been admitted on a purely arithmetic
basis, but could have been justified only if infinity were understood geometrically. Under this
interpretation, his arguments depend on an hidden premise (and, in a sense, finally reduce to
an implicit assertion of this same premise): infinity can only be conceived, correctly, as the
potential infinity of the possible divisions of a given finite magnitude; an infinite sum of terms
is correctly conceivable only if these terms represent the infinitely many parts in which an
already given finite magnitude can be divided.
Though Barrow’s general thesis about the subsumption of the domain of arithmetic under
that of geometry, constituted, as Mahoney himself remarks16, a “radical departure from tra-
dition”, the more local thesis that he was arguing for, by relying on his two examples, seems
thus to be nothing but a consequence of a well-known Aristotelian view, that Barrow explicitly
endorsed in his ninth lecture17:
Indeed we can approach nothing with Sense, but as it is terminated [. . . ]. Neither
we can conceive any Magnitude in Thought, at least distinctly, but only as it is
contained and comprehended within some Limits. We may indeed have a confused
Imagination of some Magnitude in Power, suppose a Right Line, as Aristotle said,
Barrow, the problem of the relations between arithmetic and geometry was merely that of the relations between
arguments or methods concerned with numbers (independently from the way they were understood) and the
basic operations on them, and arguments or methods concerned with geometric magnitudes. According to him,
the fact that these arguments or methods could or could not take an “algebraic” form—that is, use symbols
for species (or logisice speciosa)—was apparently not relevant for this question.
16Cf. [18], p. 186. Cf. also [15], p. 173.
17Cf. [7], pp. 142-143.
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infinite; i. e. produced or encreased at pleasure, or to a greater Distance than
any Distance assigned, which consequently was denominate infinite. Nor is the
Philosopher’s Definition of Infinite improper, though very subtle; That is infinite,
from which if one take any Quantity, something still may be assumed beyond18.
But this nothing else but to consider many Lines successively, according to a
certain arbitrary and indeterminate Power, and not one real Indeterminate Line
distinctly; which according to the Philosopher again we cannot comprehend in
the Mind. [. . . ]. The same is of an infinite Subduction or Subdivision, by which
nothing else is understood, but that a Subtraction or Division may be continued at
pleasure, without being brought to an Impossibility of proceeding farther. Again,
Aristotle speaking of Mathematicians says, Mathematicians do neither want nor
use infinite Magnitude, but take as much as they please, when they are minded to
terminate it19.
2 Parabola and square roots: Barrow’s inversion of an argu-
ment of Wallis
Here is the first of Barrow’s examples20:
It is an Arithmetical Theorem, that the Sum of an infinite ( or indefinite) Series of
Numbers increasing from Nothing to a certain Term, which is the greatest according
to the Ratio of the square Roots of Numbers continually exceeding one another by
Unity, (i.e. as 0, 1,
√
2,
√
3, &c. ad infinitum) is subsesquialter the Sum of as
many equal to the said greatest Term; Which Theorem I am of Opinion can never
be exactly demonstrated by any Method in Arithmetic itself: but it is plainly
deduced from Geometry.
In modern terms, Barrow’s theorem could be stated as follows:
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
√
i
(n+ 1)
√
n
=
2
3
. (1)
18Barrow refers to Physics III. 9. The reference to Bekker’s text is rather 207a, 7-8. Here is Hardie’s and
Gaye’s translation, revised by J. Barnes [cf. [4], vol. I, p. 352]: “Thus something is infinite if, taking it quantity
by quantity, we can always take something outside.”
19Barrow refers to Physics III. 11. The reference to Bekker’s text is rather 207b, 27-31. Here is Hardie’s and
Gaye’s translation revised by J. Barnes [cf. [4], vol. I, p. 354]: “Our account does not rob the mathematicians
of their science, by disproving the actual existence of the infinite in the direction of increase, in the sense of
the untraversable. In point of fact they do not need the infinite and do not use it. They postulate only that a
finite straight line may be produced as far as they wish.”
20Cf. [7], p. 31.
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Hence, his last claim is, strictly speaking, false: this theorem can be proved by purely arith-
metical means. Still, this is quite hard to do, and Barrow can certainly not be blamed for not
having grasped this possibility. A way to get a proof is to rely on a beautiful result obtained
by Srinivasa Ramanujan21 that provides a general expression for the sum
n∑
i=0
√
i, for any value
of n. I expose this proof in the annex 1.
If no general expression for the sum
n∑
i=0
√
i is known, there is no way to prove Barrow’s
theorem in arithmetical terms. The more natural and easy non arithmetical way to prove it
is through an argument based on an appropriate integration. In the annex 2, I show how this
argument works.
The geometric proof suggested by Barrow is, in a sense, an informal version of such an
argument. Here is his how he presents it22:
For if the Diameter of any Parabola be conceived to be divided indefinitely into
many equal Parts, then the Right Lines which are ordinately applied to the Di-
ameter, through the Points of the Divisions23, will proceed in the same Ratio, as
is shewn in Geometry: But the Parabola which is constituted of these, whether
Right Lines or Parallelograms, is there also demonstrated to be Subsesquialter to
the Parallelogram, upon the same Base and the same Height, or which is the same
thing, to the Sum composed of as many Right Lines or Parallelograms equal to
the greatest: From whence, the Agreement of Arithmetic with Geometry being
supposed which we desire to advance, it plainly follows, that a Series of Numbers
of this sort is Subsesquialter the Sum of as many equal to the greatest.
Supposing that ω is an infinite (integer) number, the theorem we have stated before in the
form (1) could be stated as follows
ω∑
i=0
√
i
(ω + 1)
√
ω
=
2
3
, (2)
21Cf. [33]. Ramanujan’s short note contains a more general result than the one that this proof appeals to.
This last result is stated in the first part of section 1: less that ten lines of text.
22Cf. [7], p. 31.
23Kirkby’s translation omits here a parenthesis: (vel parallelogramma que altra illis insistentia)”. Barrow
seems not to be willing, here, to take a definite decision about the dimension of the indivisibles he is using.
This is, in fact, an irrelevant question, for the purpose of the argument he is exposing (hence, I shall not insist
on this point either, in my commentaries). Later, namely in lecture IX, he comes back on the question by
discussing both the notion of indivisible and the grounds of the method of indivisibles, and arguing that the
former is rightful insofar as indivisibles are taken not to be homogenous with the magnitudes they are the
indivisibles of and these magnitudes are not supposed to be composed by them, but the latter is correct insofar
as indivisibles are replaced by infinitesimals, which are, instead, homogenous parts of the relevant magnitudes.
Cf. on this matter [21], pp. 75-81.
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which seems to me to be closer to Barrow’s conceptions.
To prove that it is so, Barrow suggested inverting the type of arguments that Wallis had
relied on, in his Arithmetica infinitorum24, in order to justify his method of quadrature. In
the case of the parabola25, Wallis’ argument depended on the preliminary admission of the
arithmetic equality
h∑
i=0
i2
(h+ 1)h2
=
1
3
+
1
6h
. (3)
By supposing that the (finite) sums entering the ratio figuring in the left-hand side of this
equality are replaced by “infinite series”, he got, then,
ω∑
i=0
i2
(ω + 1)ω2
=
1
3
, (4)
where ω is an infinite number26. This was, for him, a sufficient basis for concluding that27
the ratio between the curvilinear triangle OMA and the parallelogram OPMA is that of 1 to 3,
supposing that OM is an arc of parabola of vertex O, OP is a portion of the axis of this same
parabola, and OA is tangent to OM at O.
The reason he advanced for justifying this conclusion was that the segments parallel to OP,
drawn from OA up to OM (and thus their projections over OP), are to the segments parallel
to OA, drawn from OP up to OM “in ratione duplicata” (and the segments parallel to OA,
drawn from OP up to OM—and thus their projections over OA—are to the segments parallel
to OP, drawn from OA up to OM “in subduplicata ratione”), and that the curvilinear triangle
OMA “consists of” the former, whereas the parallelogram OPMA “consists of all the segments
like OM, equal to the greatest of them.”
24Cf. [40] and [28], ch. 1. Similar methods were also imagined and employed by Fermat, Mengoli, Pascal,
and Roberval: cf.: [44], p. 319; [5], pp. 150-156; [20], p. 36; and [24], pp. 259 and 265-268.
25Cf. [40], propp. XIX-XXIII, pp. 15-18.
26As a matter of fact, Wallis did not write any equality like (4). He simply claimed [cf. [40], prop. XXI,
p. 17] that: “Si pro ponatur series infinita Quantitatum in dupplicata ratione arithmetice-proportionaliu¯ [. . . ]
continue crescentium, a puncto seu 0 inchoatarum; erit illa ad seriem totidem maximaæ æqualium, ut 1 ad 3.”
Considering the simpler case of the ratio
hP
i=0
i
(h+1)h
(which is easily proved to be equal to 1
2
, for any value of h),
Wallis was a little bit more explicit about the nature of his sums [cf. [40], prop. II, p. 2] : “Si sumatur series
Quantitatum Arithmetice` proportionalium [. . . ] continue` crescentium, a puncto vel 0 inchoatarum, & numero
quidem vel finitarum vel infinitarum (nulla enim discriminis causa erit,) erit illa ad seriem totidem maximaæ
æqualium, ut 1 ad 2.” It seems thus that Wallis was willing to avoid any explicit discussion about the difference
between the finitary and the infinitary cases of his equalities, by presenting the latter as quite natural (that is,
unproblematic) extensions of the former. My mere replacement of “h” with “ω” is just intended to reflect this
attitude.
27Cf. [40], propp. XXIII, pp. 17-18.
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Wallis’ method had thus three main components. In the case of the parabola, these are
the following: the establishment of the equality (3) and the infinitary extension of this result
enabling one to get the equality (4); the identification of the curvilinear triangle OPM and
the parallelogram OPMA—at least when their ratio was concerned—with appropriate infinite
aggregates of parallel segments; the assimilation of the ratio of these aggregates of segments
with the ratio of appropriate series of numbers28.
Barrow’s argument shares the last two components of Wallis’ method, but, by inverting the
direction of deduction, replaces the first one with the admission of a previous quadrature of the
parabola. Though he did not mention his sources for this last result, he would have certainly
mentioned the proposition 24 of Archimedes’ Quadrature of the parabola, if the question had
been asked of him. Two years after the publication of Barrow’s Mathematical Lectures, in
1685, the English (and first) edition of Wallis’s Algebra was published, and there, the latter
came back to his method of quadrature29, by ascribing to the same Archimedes the crucial
result (3), that he identified with the content of the proposition 10 of the treatise On Spiral.
Moreover, he appropriately accommodated Archimedes’ proof of such a proposition so to get
a perfectly rigorous proof, by reducio ad absurdum, of this arithmetical result, and maintained
that analogous proofs could also be given for the corresponding results entering the other
applications of his method of quadrature contained in the Arithmetica infinitorum.
28As it is clearly shown by the quotations included in the previous footnote (26), Wallis claimed that the
equality (4), as well as the corresponding equality
ωP
i=0
i
(ω+1)ω
= 1
2
, hold for any series of quantities in double or
arithmetical proportion, respectively. This is quite obvious, since, for any exponent n and any quantity α, one
has:
hP
i=0
(iα)n
(h+ 1) (hα)n
=
αn
hP
i=0
in
αn (h+ 1)hn
=
hP
i=0
in
(h+ 1)hn
,
and the problem of determining the first of these ratios reduces to that of calculating the last one. The crucial
point in Wallis’ argument is not concerned, however, with the simple and quite obvious equality of a ratio of
series of segments (that is, magnitudes) and a ratio of series of numbers, but rather with the assimilation of
these ratios with a ratio of infinite aggregates of segments, each of which constitutes a bidimensional figure. As
a matter of fact, this is a sort of analogy between an arithmetical and a geometrical relation.
29Cf. [42], pp. 298-304.
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Though this last claim is highly questionable (at least if possibility is understood as an
effective one, with respect to the actual capacities of early-modern mathematicians), Wal-
lis’s appeal to the authority of Archimedes would have been, in itself, sufficient for denying
that Barrow’s argument could provide a geometric justification for the equality (3) that were
somehow more appropriate than any arithmetical justification.
But, as a matter of fact, this is not what Barrow claimed. His point was subtler. He
rather claimed that the interpretation of a ratio of arithmetical sums as a ratio of geometric
figures is appropriate to show that the equality (4) is equivalent to the equality (2). In other
words, Barrow’s point seems to be the following: once this interpretation is admitted and
the quadrature of the parabola is obtained, the passage to arithmetic can be realized in two
trivially equivalent ways: either by remarking that the arithmetical ratio which corresponds
to the ratio of the curvilinear triangle OMA and the parallelogram OPMA—according to a
partition of these figures in their components parallel to the axis OP—is 13 , or by remarking
that the arithmetical ratio corresponding to the ratio of the curvilinear triangle OPM and the
parallelogram OPMA—according to a partition of these figures in their components parallel to
the tangent OA—is 23 . The triviality of this equivalence is the gain obtained by the involvement
of geometry that Barrow seems to underline.
This is an effective gain, indeed: so effective that Wallis himself had surreptitiously taken
advantage of it, by claiming, in the Arithmetica infinitorum30, that, provided that the “com-
plement of the semi-parabola” (that is, OMA) is to the parallelogram OPMA as 1 to 3, “con-
sequently, the semi-parabola itself is to the same parallelogram as 2 to 3.”
But is this gain enough to support the thesis of a subsumption of the domain of arithmetic
under that of geometry? Three points should be made here.
Firstly, one should observe that, without the help of some version of the calculus—which
Barrow did not know in 1664 and that could hardly be understood as a natural extension
of classical geometry—a similar gain could not be but a local one, since it is quite hard to
generalize Archimedes’ quadrature of the parabola with the mere tools of classical geometry.
This simple remark seems to me strong enough to show that Barrow’s argument was, from
the point of view of the internal evolution of mathematics, completely out of place.
Secondly, it is easy to remark that, in getting the equality (2) by relying on the quadra-
ture of the parabola, rather than on an infinitary extension of an appropriate finite equality
analogous to the equality (3)—that is, of an equality equivalent to the equality (27), provid-
ing Ramanujan’s expression for the sum
n∑
i=0
√
i, for any value of n—Barrow’s argument does
not provide any clue as to such a finite equality. Certainly, as already said, no one could
blame Barrow for not having got Ramanujan’s expression. Still, his very argument shows that
geometry—at least if it is used the way he suggested—is not powerful enough to lead to any
arithmetical result that one could be willing to obtain.
30Cf. [40], propp. XXIII, pp. 17.
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Thirdly, and mainly, I think: one cannot forget that Barrow’s argument shares the second
and third main components of Wallis’ method. So the question is obvious: how could one
pretend to have offered an argument for the subsumption of the domain of arithmetic under
that of geometry, by relying on an argument based on the assimilation of the ratio of some infi-
nite aggregates of segments with the ratio of some series of numbers? This assimilation could,
indeed, be read both to show that geometry provides a model for the mutual relations between
the terms of an arithmetical sum, and to show that the relevant features of this model are also
the features of an arithmetical ratio. This is a general problem concerning Barrow’s thesis:
the claim that arithmetic is nothing but an appropriate language to speak about (geometric)
magnitudes seems to be nothing but the reverse of the claim that arithmetic is the pure and
more abstract expression of the relations that (geometric) magnitudes comply with. Thus,
many reasons advanced to support the former claim can, quite easily, be reversed so as to pro-
duce reasons to support the latter. This is, in any case, what happens with Barrow’s argument
that we are discussing. Barrow himself implicitly acknowledges this, when he remarks that
the equality (4) follows from the quadrature of the parabola, provided that “the Agreement of
Arithmetic with Geometry [. . . ][is] supposed.” His argument is, essentially, the same as that
of Wallis: whereas Barrow relies on it for supporting his thesis of a subsumption of the domain
of arithmetic under that of geometry, Wallis relies on it for founding an arithmetical method
of quadrature. But for this argument to hold, the agreement of arithmetic with geometry has
to be supposed, and there is no way to decide, on the basis of this argument, whether such an
agreement has to be understood as a reduction of the former to the latter, or of the latter to
the former, or also as nothing but a local fruitful cooperation.
Thus, all that Barrow could have pretended to show with his example, in the perspec-
tive of the internal evolution of mathematics, is that, in the case under examination, the
geometric understanding of the relevant relations—which is a particular form of functional
understanding—is able to make manifest the equivalence of the equalities (4) and (2). This
is because this understanding allows us to grasp, so to speak, the hidden linearity that is
responsible for this equivalence.
Still, Barrow’s point is open to another interpretation: not a mathematical one, but rather
an outright philosophical one. When Wallis’ deduction of the quadrature of the parabola based
on the equality (4) is compared with Barrow’s inverse deduction of the equality (2) based on
this same quadrature, in the light of the conceptual tools of the Aristotelian philosophy of
mathematics—rather than of the conceptual tools of mathematical practice—an asymmetry
appears. The sort of infinity involved in the equality (2) is actual infinity by addition; the
sort of infinity involved in the quadrature of the parabola is potential infinity by division. In
the first case, infinity is an attribute of an object—the infinite sum—that appears as being
constituted by an infinity of parts. In the second case, infinity is an attribute of a sequence of
possible acts which take as their substratum a continuous object given beforehand. Whereas,
in the first case, the arithmetical theorem to be proved on a purely arithmetical basis is
appropriately expressed by the very equality (2), in the second case, this same theorem is
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more appropriately expressed by an equality like
n∑
i=0
√
iε
(n+ 1)
=
2
3
, (5)
where ε is an infinitely small portion of OP which is supposed to be equal to 1
n
of it (so that
n becomes infinite).
I suggest that the only point that Barrow’s example can support is that his own deduction
of the equality (2), based of the quadrature of the parabola is preferable over Wallis inverse
deduction since the latter form of infinity is a legitimate one, whereas the former is not, or,
better, since the former form becomes legitimate only if it is understood as an expression of
the latter: if a model for it is provided, where the infinity appears to be a potential infinity
by division. This is a classical thesis, an Aristotelian thesis, in fact. Moreover, it is a thesis
that—sometimes asserted, sometimes denied—appears at different historical junctures. But
this is a philosophical thesis: a thesis that has often gone together with an assessment of some
mathematical theories, or that has even suggested or promoted the establishment of some
of them, but that has never provided the relevant conceptual tools to help mathematics to
progress31.
3 Motion and geometric series
I come now to the second example32. Here it is:
The Sum of a Series of Numbers infinitely decreasing in a triple Ratio [better: “The
Series or Sum of Numbers infinitely decreasing continually from Unity (included)
in a triple ratio”] (i.e. as 1, 13 ,
1
9 ,
1
27 , &c.) till the last or least Term be nothing
is to Unity as 3 to 2; or the same Sum excluding Unity is equal to 12 [better: “the
half of the Unity”]. This Theorem (which for Easiness and Perspicuity sake, I have
proposed in a determinate, viz. a triple Ratio) although it may be demonstrated
Universally, yet I think, by making Use of continued Quantity, it will be shewn
much more clearly and expeditiously, at least more handsomely and elegantly.
[. . . ] This Theorem universally is as follows. The Sum of any Series of Numbers
[better: “The Series of Numbers”] continually decreasing from Unity infinitely, or
to Nothing, in any Proportion, will be to Unity, as the Antecedent, or greater Term
of the Proportion, is to the Excess of the Antecedent above the Consequent. Or the
31In the particular case under examination, this is confirmed by the fact that, in the absence of a functional
notion of limit and/or of any version of the calculus, the difference between the equalities (2) and (5) is perfectly
ineffective.
32Cf. [7], pp. 31-33. The brackets include some suggestions for slight corrections of Kirkby’s translation.
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same Sum, excluding Unity, will be to Unity, as the Consequent, or lesser Term of
the Proportion, is to the Excess of the Antecedent above the Consequent.[. . . ] So
easily are Arithmetical conclusions, (otherwise sufficiently intricate and difficult to
be investigated) drawn from the Consideration of Geometry. Thus doth the one
Science require the help of the other, and after a friendly sort conspire together.
Barrow’s claim about the virtue of a geometric proof (or, as he said, of a proof “making
Use of continued Quantity”, that is, magnitudes) is, in this case, much weaker than in the case
of the first example: far from maintaining that the arithmetical theorem under consideration
cannot be proved in purely arithmetical terms, he argued that geometry makes it possible to
prove such a theorem “much more clearly and expeditiously, at least more handsomely and
elegantly”, and that any other different proof (that is, any arithmetical one) is “sufficiently
intricate and difficult”. Such a cautious attitude was imposed by the fact that Barrow was
probably aware that, at the time of his lectures, the theorem had been already proved arith-
metically at least once, namely by Vie`te, in a treatise first published in 1593, and reprinted
in 1646 within Van Schooten’s edition of Vie`te’s Opera Mathematica33. But, judged from a
strictly mathematical point of view, Barrow’s attitude is not cautious enough, however, since
Vie`te’s proof—or proofs, since, as we shall see later, one could recognize two distinct proofs
of the same theorem in Vie`te’s text—are far from being “intricate and difficult”, and could be
hardy considered as less clear, compact and elegant than Barrow’s one. Moreover, the same
theorem can also be proved—and was actually proved, after 1664, by many mathematicians—
in purely arithmetical, or at least in non-geometric terms, according to quite simple arguments,
different from Vie`te’s, that Barrow probably became aware of, or, in any case, would have
certainly easily understood. Thus, also in this case, if we want to assign to Barrow’s example
some argumentative force, we need to consider it from a different point of view.
3.1 Barrow’s proof
Let us begin with the geometric proof he suggested. This is, in fact, a double one, since it
concerns successively the particular case where the base and the ratio of the geometric series
are 1 and 13 , respectively, and the general case.
In the particular case, the theorem can be stated as follows, in modern notation:
1 +
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . . =
∞∑
i=0
(
1
3
)i
=
3
2
, that is,
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . . =
∞∑
i=1
(
1
3
)i
=
1
2
. (6)
33Cf. [38], ch. XVII, and [39], pp. 397-398. The conjecture that Barrow knew of Vie`te’s proof is supported
by the fact that Van Schooten’s edition was part of Barrow’s library at the time of his death, in 1677, and was
probably there also in 1664: cf. [14] , pp. 368 and 336, respectively.
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In the general case, this becomes, of course:
1 + x+ x2 + x3 + . . . =
∞∑
i=0
xi =
1
1− x , that is, x+ x
2 + x3 + . . . =
∞∑
i=0
xi =
x
1− x, (7)
where one should implicitly suppose that x < 1. This can also be written in an even more
general form, at least apparently. It is enough to replace the unity with any number α, as the
base or first term of the series, and to suppose that the second term is any other number β,
so that the ratio—or “proportion”, as Barrow said—is β
α
. One gets, then:
α+ β +
β2
α
+
β3
α2
+ . . . =
∞∑
i=0
βi
αi−1
=
α2
α− β , (8)
where one should implicitly suppose that β < α.
Barrow’s proof relies on the consideration of a geometrical model associated with the
Achilles paradox, that I shall call, for short, “Achilles paradox model”. Here is this proof34:
...
 ZA
E
F Æ
G
H
Suppose the movable point A to be carried through the Right Line AZ, with an
uniform Motion: Also imagine the point E to be moved uniformly through the
same, but with a Velocity subtriple the Velocity wherewith the Point A is carried;
then, in whatsoever time the Point A runs through the Right Line AE in the
same time will the Point E run through a third part of AE, suppose EF. Also in
whatsoever time the former Point runs through the Right Line EF, in the same
time will the latter run through the third Part of EF, suppose FG, and so on, ad
infinitum, till the Point A overtake E in Æ. Now if we suppose the Line AE to be
the Unity, then will EF be 13 ; FG
1
9 , and GH
1
27 , &c. ad infinitum, according to the
Hypothesis; but it appears that the line A[[Æ]] run through by A is triple the Line
EÆ which is run through by E in the same time, because A is supposed to move with
three times the Velocity of E. Therefore EÆ is to AE[[, hoc est series decrescens,
exclusaˆ unitate, ad unitatem, ut 1 ad 2: Et AÆ se habet ad AE]] (i. e. the decreasing
34Cf. [7], pp. 32-33. The simple brackets include some suggestions for slight corrections of Kirkby’s transla-
tion. The double brackets include some other corrections relative to three typographical errors in the English
translation of Kirkby (only one of which also appears in the original Latin text [cf. [9], pp. 36-37): in the first
case the English text has “E”, instead of “Æ” that correctly occurs in the original text; in the second case the
part in double brackets, that occurs in the original text, is omitted; in the third case, both the English and
the original texts have “AE : EÆ :: R − S : S”, instead of “AÆ : EÆ :: R : S”, as would be correct (this
typographical error is corrected in [8] , p. 49).
14
Series including Unity is to Unity) as 3 to 2. Q. E. D. [. . . ] For the foregoing
Premisses being supposed, let the Ratio be given between R and S, and let AE
represent [better: “be”] Unity, as above; then because AÆ (i. e. AE+EÆ) : EÆ : :R :
S. therefore (by dividing the Proportion) AE : EÆ : : R − S : S. i. e. Unity
is to the Sum of the proposed Series [better: “to the proposed Series”], as the
Excess of the Terms of the Proportion is to the lesser Term: And again, because
[[AÆ : EÆ :: R : S]]. therefore AÆ : AE :: R : R − S, by Conversion, i. e. the
proposed Sum [better: “the proposed Series”] including Unity, is to Unity, as the
greater Term of the Proportion is to its Excess above the lesser.
Let us suppose two “movable points” to be moved with uniform rectilinear motion on a
straight line AZ, starting from two fixed points A and E. Let us also suppose that the velocity
of the first of these points is the velocity of the second as 3 to 1, in the particular case, or as
R to S (S < R), in the general case. Let us finally suppose that the first point reaches the
second at Æ. It follows that
AÆ : EÆ = 3 : 1 or AÆ : EÆ = R : S, (9)
and, as AE = AÆ−EÆ,
AÆ : AE = 3 : 2 and EÆ : AE = 1 : 2,
or
AÆ : AE = R : R− S and EÆ : AE = S : R− S.
But, to come to Æ, the two points pass through the points E, F, G, H,. . . and F, G, H,. . . ,
respectively, where they are at the same time. Thus
AE : EF = EF : FG = FG : GH = . . . = 3 : 1
or
AE : EF = EF : FG = FG : GH = . . . = R : S,
(10)
and hence:
AÆ = AE+ EF+ FG+ GH+ . . . = AE+
1
3
AE+
1
3
EF+
1
3
FG+ . . .
= AE+
1
3
AE+
1
3
1
3
AE+
1
3
1
3
1
3
AE+ . . .
(11)
or
AÆ = AE+ EF+ FG+ GH+ . . . = AE+
S
R
AE+
S
R
EF+
S
R
FG+ . . .
= AE+
S
R
AE+
S
R
S
R
AE+
S
R
S
R
S
R
AE+ . . .
. (12)
15
It is thus enough to suppose that AE is, or represents unity, to conclude that
1 +
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . . =
3
2
and
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
=
1
2
, (13)
or
1+
S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+
(
S
R
)3
+ . . . =
R
R− S and
S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+
(
S
R
)3
+ . . . =
S
R− S , (14)
according to (6) and (7), respectively.
If one supposes, instead, that AÆ, AE, and EF are or represent any triple of quantities Z,
α, and β (such that β < α < Z), one gets:
Z : Z − α = α : β,
instead of (9), and hence, because of (10):
Z =
α2
α− β = α+ β +
β2
α
+
β3
α2
+ . . . , (15)
according to (8). This is just what Barrow remarks in a short, purely formalistic, footnote
inserted after the claim that the theorem “may be demonstrated Universally35”. The footnote
specifies how it might be done. Here is this footnote:
Thus:
Z − o : Z − α : : α : β.
Zβ = Zα− αα.
αα = Zα− Zβ.
αα
α− β = Z.
3.2 Is Barrow’s proof essentially geometric?
Barrow’s proof is quite easy and, of course, it is right. But, as already said, an equally
easy arithmetical proof for the same theorem was quite certainly known by Barrow himself.
Before considering the latter in detail, one should answer a preliminary question concerning
the former: is this a genuine geometric proof? Of course, what is relevant is not whether it
is geometric or kinematic (since we can, for our purpose, admit Barrow’s view, according to
which kinematics—or at least the small fragment of kinematics that is used in this proof—
and geometry do not essentially differ). The point is rather whether its geometric features
35Cf. [7], pp. 32.
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are essential for the success of the argument, and whether these depend or not on more
fundamental arithmetic conditions.
The Achilles paradox model plays a double role in Barrow’s proof. Firstly, it provides a
model for the geometric series. This is not only a geometric model. It is also, so to speak, a
phenomenal one: it includes both an infinite partition of a finite segment, and an interpretation
of this segment and its partition as geometric representations of a physical phenomenon. The
model is thus strong enough to ensure that, in so far as the ratio of a geometric series is
smaller than 1 (or, more generally of the ratio that any quantity has with itself), this series
has a (finite) sum, and to represent this sum under the form of an already given segment:
the segment AÆ. The proof of the theorem is thus reduced to the solution of a problem: to
determine the quantitative relations that this segment has with its parts under the relevant
partition. Secondly, the Achilles paradox model suggests the way to solve this problem, since
it goes together with the establishment of the proportions (9). These proportions being given,
and the interpretation of the geometric series provided by this model being admitted, the
solution of the problem is indeed a trivial exercise.
Now, let us suppose that the existence of a (finite) sum for a geometric series is admitted
on different and independent bases. Of course, this is not the same as supposing that this
sum is known. But this sum is not known under the interpretation provided by the Achilles
paradox model either. It is represented by a segment, but this segment is, in fact, unknown.
To trace such a segment and take it as if it were known, as Barrow suggests, is thus part of
an analytic practice. A similar practice can also be applied to the (finite) sum of a geometric
series that, according to our supposition, has been admitted to exist: let U be this sum. We
shall have:
1 +
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . . = U or 1 +
S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+
(
S
R
)3
+ . . . = U. (16)
As a matter of fact, this is a sufficient premise to prove the theorem in a purely arithmetic
way, since from it, it follows that:
U − 1 = 1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . .
=
1
3
(
1 +
1
3
+
1
9
+ . . .
)
=
1
3
U
or
U − 1 = S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+
(
S
R
)3
+ . . .
=
S
R
(
1 +
(
S
R
)
+
(
S
R
)2
+ . . .
)
=
S
R
U
and thus
2
3
U = 1 or
R− S
R
U = 1,
according to (13) and (14), respectively.
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The equalities U − 1 = 13U and U − 1 = SRU are equivalent, of course, to the proportions
U : U − 1 = 3 : 1 and U = U − 1 = R : S,
which are, in turn, equivalent to the proportions (9). On the other hand, the equalities
(11) and (12) add no information which supplements that in the equalities (16): they simply
correspond to these last equalities under the interpretation provided by the Achilles paradox
model. It follows that, once the existence of a (finite) sum for the geometric series is admitted
without relying on the Achilles paradox model—that is, when other and independent reasons
for supporting this admission are provided—the theorem can be proved, in purely arithmetical
terms, according to a line of argumentation that parallels Barrow’s geometric argument. The
second role played in this proof by the Achilles paradox model is thus far from essential: the
proof can be repeated, mutatis mutandis, without relying on such a setting relative to this
role, provided that the existence of a (finite) sum for the geometric series is admitted on
independent bases.
On the other hand, one could wonder whether the admission of the existence of a sum
for a geometric series and its expression by a term like “U” are essential for conducting the
previous proof. It is easy to understand that they are not. It is rather enough that a geometric
series itself is handled as a (finite) quantity. If this is admitted, the proof can be rephrased as
follows:

1 +
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . . = 1 +
[
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . .
]
= 1 +
1
3
[
1 +
1
3
+
1
9
+ . . .
]

⇒ 23
[
1 +
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+ . . .
]
= 1
or 

1 +
S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+
(
S
R
)3
+ . . . = 1 +
[
S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+
(
S
R
)3
+ . . .
]
= 1 +
S
R
[
1 +
S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+ . . .
]


⇒
⇒ R− S
R
[
1 +
S
R
+
(
S
R
)2
+
(
S
R
)3
+ . . .
]
= 1.
Barrow’s proof is thus, as a matter of fact, a geometric version of a purely arithmetical
proof based on the supposition that a geometric series has a (finite) sum or can, at least,
be handled as a (finite) quantity: the result of an interpretation of such a proof according
to a model as vivid as the Achilles paradox one. This interpretation is certainly elegant
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and heuristically evocative, but it has no relevant mathematical function in the proof of the
theorem other than that of warranting the existence of a (finite) sum of a geometric series or,
at least, the possibility of handling this series as a (finite) quantity.
Still, it openly suggests a generalization of this theorem to any sort of quantity, namely
its extension to magnitudes. Under this extension, this theorem ceases to be an arithmetical
theorem and cannot, of course, have a purely arithmetical proof. The equivalence between
Barrow’s proof, relying on the Achilles paradox model, and its underlying arithmetical proof
has, thus, an important mathematical function: that of showing which operational properties
a domain of magnitudes has to satisfy for the sum of a geometric series to be definable and
provably determinable on such a domain. Both the notation that Barrow uses in the general
version of his proof, and the short, purely formalistic text of his footnote that provides a proof
of the equality (15) suggest that Barrow was willing to implicitly point out such a possible
extension. The symbols “R”, “S”, “Z”, “α”, and “β” in the context of these proofs, have,
indeed, a quite natural interpretation as symbols designating any sort of quantity, namely
numbers or continuous magnitudes: note that, whereas Barrow writes the fraction “13”, giving
the ratio of the geometric series in the particular case, he does not write the corresponding
fractions “ S
R
”, and “α
β
”, and, when he writes the fraction “ αα
α−β”, he is, quite probably, as we
shall see, quoting Vie`te implicitly.
But, if the Achilles paradox model is not understood as a geometric model of a configuration
of arithmetical objects, that is, numbers, but rather as a kinematic interpretation of the
geometric configuration attached to a geometric series defined on the domain of segments—
the domain where any relation between magnitudes was usually represented in the modern
age—, then it ceases to be a basis for a geometric reformulation of an arithmetical proof
of an arithmetical theorem. It rather becomes a basis for interpreting a general theorem
concerning any sort of quantity, and specially magnitudes, on the domain of segments. In 1664,
two possible contexts for stating a similar theorem, and proving it, were available36: Vie`te’s
common algebra, where multiplication and division were axiomatically defined on quantities of
any sort; and Descartes’ geometric algebra, where multiplication and division were explicitly
defined on magnitudes by relying on appropriate proportions. In both cases, far from being
reduced to geometry, arithmetic provided an explicit model for a formalism to be used to make
geometry in a new way. Thus, although it suggests the possibility of extending the theorem
that Barrow explicitly refers only to numbers also to magnitudes, Barrow’s geometric proof
of this theorem is quite far from supporting the thesis of a subsumption of the domain of
arithmetic under that of geometry.
From these considerations it follows that such a proof can be understood as essentially
geometric only in so far as the appeal to a geometric model—like the Achilles paradox one—is
conceived as the only way to warrant the existence of a (finite) sum for a geometric series,
or, at least, to license the manipulation of such a series as a (finite) quantity. Were one
36Cf. [28], Introduction, and p. 3 above.
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ready to admit the existence of such a sum or the possibility of a similar manipulation of a
geometric series, this proof should not be understood as essentially geometric. Moreover, its
reformulation as a purely arithmetical proof is enough to show that it is not clearer, more
compact and elegant than any arithmetical proof.
3.3 Vie`te’s proof
This last claim is also confirmed by the consideration of Vie`te’s proofs37.
Chapter XVII of Vie`te’s Variorum de rebus mathematicis responsorum, liber VIII 38 has a
quite explicit title: “Progressio Geometrica”. It is a very short chapter, since, as Vie`te said,
the whole theory of geometric progressions can be summed up in only one theorem, together
with four simple corollaries that, by alluding to Euclid’s Data39, Vie`te calls “δεδoµε´να”40:
Progressionis Geometricæ doctrina uno fere` absoluitor Theoremate, diductis videlicet
ex eo quatuor δεδoµε´νoις.
Here is this theorem, as it appears in Van Schooten’s edition of Vie`te’s Opera Mathemat-
ica41, where Barrow probably read it42:
Theorema. Si fuerint magnitudines continue proportionales: erit ut terminus
rationis major ad terminum rationis minorem, ut differentia compositæ ex omnibus
& minimæ ad differentiam compositæ ex omnibus & maximæ.
Sint magnitudines continue proportionales, quarum maxima sit D, minima X,
& composita ex omnibus F , & sit ratio majoris ad minorem sicut D ad B. Dico
esse ut D ad B, ita F minus X ad F minus D.
In Vie`te’s original treatise, the first part of the theorem is different43:
Si fuerint magnitudines continue` proportionales, Erit ut terminus rationis maior ad
terminum rationis minorem, ita composita ex omnibus ad differentiam compositæ
ex omnibus & maximæ.
The difference is all the more surprising as it does not repeat itself in the second part of the
theorem, that, in the original text of Vie`te, is thus inconsistent with the first part.
37My attention was first drawn to this proof by Jean Dhombres who—in his [11], pp. 149-154—has suggested
it provides an example of a “suspended analysis”.
38Cf. [38], pp. 28v -29r, and [39], pp. 397-398.
39Cf. [11], p. 151.
40Cf. [38], p. 28v, and [39], p. 397.
41Cf. [39], p. 397.
42Cf. [39], p. 397. Cf. also the previous footnote (33).
43Cf. [38], p. 28v.
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In Vie`te’s notation, D andX are, respectively, the first and the last term of the progression,
which are also the greater and the smaller, since the progression is taken to be decreasing;
F is its sum, and its ratio is that of D to B, so that B is the second term. Hence, in Van
Schooten’s edition, the first and second part of the theorem agree in stating that
D : B = F −X : F −D. (17)
It seems thus, under this version of Vie`te’s statement, that the progression is finite, and is, thus,
not yet a series, in our sense. The existence of its sum F would then be unproblematic, and
Vie`te’s theorem would amount to an obvious consequence of the conjunction of the propositions
V.12 and VII.12 of the Elements, since it seems obvious that Vie`te included (positive integer)
numbers among what he called “magnitudes”, in the statement of the theorem.
Here are Euclid’s propositions, in Heath’s translation44:
[V.12] If any number of magnitudes be proportional, as one of the antecedents is
to one of the consequents, so will all the antecedents be to all the consequents.
[VII.12] If there be as many numbers as we please in proportion, then, as one of
the antecedents is to one of the consequents, so are all the antecedents to all the
consequents.
Using indexes, and supposing that αi and βi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) are 2n quantities such that
α1 : β1 = α2 : β2 = α3 : β3 = . . . = αn−1 : βn−1 = αn : βn, (18)
these propositions assert that
(α1 + α2 + α3 + . . .+ αn−1 + αn) : (β1 + β2 + β3 + . . .+ βn−1 + βn) = α1 : β1, (19)
provided that α1 : β1 = αλ : βλ, for any λ such that 1 ≤ λ ≤ n. Euclid’s proofs rely on his
definitions of proportion between magnitudes and (positive integer) numbers—the very well
known definitions V.5 and VII.20—and to appropriate linearity properties of magnitudes and
(positive integer) numbers, established in propositions V.1, VII.5 and VII.6, that is:
if a = ha′, b = hb′, . . . z = hz′, then a+ b+ . . .+ z = h
(
a′ + b′ + . . .+ z′
)
and
if hα1 = kβ1 and hα2 = kβ2, then h (α1 + α2) = k (β1 + β2) ,
where a, b,. . . , z, and a′, b′,. . . , z′ are whatever magnitudes and h and k, are whatever (positive
integer) numbers. In both cases the proof is immediate. Supposing that the fundamental
44Cf. [12], vol. 2, pp. 159 and 312.
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properties of proportions are admitted, the same propositions can, on the other hand, be
proved by reiterating the following argument as many times as necessary45:
if α1 : β1 = α2 : β2 then α1 : α2 = β1 : β2,
and hence (α1 + α2) : α1 = (β1 + β2) : β2,
that is, (α1 + α2) : (β1 + β2) = α1 : β2.
Whatever proof one adopts, the implication ‘if the multiple proportion (18) holds, then
the (simple) proportion (19) holds’ is quite unproblematic in the tradition of Euclid’s math-
ematics. To draw, from it, the proportion (17), is then enough to suppose that αi+1 = βi
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1), then replace α1 with D, β1 = α2 with B, and βn with X. Under these
replacements, from the continuous proportion
D : B = B : β2 = β2 : β3 = . . . = βn−2 : βn−1 = βn−1 : X,
one gets, indeed, according to this implication:
(D +B + β2 + . . .+ βn−2 + βn−1) : (B + β2 + . . .+ βn−2 + βn−1 + βn) = D : B,
that is just the proportion (17), provided that
D +B + β2 + . . .+ βn−2 + βn−1 + βn = F.
The second part of Vie`te’s theorem—or this whole theorem, in Van Schooten’s version—is
thus a triviality in the tradition of Euclid’s mathematics. Vie`te’s new algebraic formalism
could have allowed to add very little to such a triviality: just an explicit way to denote the
terms of the progression included between D and X, so as to write the geometric progression
under the form
D +B +
B2
D
+
B3
D2
+ . . .+
Bn
Dn−1
,
where B
n
Dn−1
= X, and thus to express, openly, the fact that these terms are in a continuous
proportion to each other46.
It is plausible to guess that Van Schooten’s version of the theorem depends on nothing
but a correction of a banal material mistake made by Vie`te himself because of his eagerness
45But remark that this argument appeals to the proposition V.16, which asserts that if α1 : β1 = α2 : β2,
then α1 : α2 = β1 : β2, and is proved, in turn, by Euclid, by appealing to V.12.
46But remark that, once the progression is so written, there is room to prove Vie`te’s theorem in an alternative
way, by observing that
D +B +
B2
D
+
B3
D2
+ . . .+
Bn
Dn−1
=
Dn +Dn−1B +Dn−2B2 + . . . Bn
Dn−1
,
and
Dn+1 −Bn+1 = (D −B) `Dn +Dn−1B + . . .+DBn−1 +Bn´ ,
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to state his own relevant addition to the previous Euclidean result. If it were so, there would
be no reason to be surprised that Vie`te offered no proof of his theorem, and that he used his
algebraic formalism only to draw from the proportion (17) the announced corollaries, that,
according to such a formalism, immediately follow from this theorem, whatever the nature of
the quantities D, B, and X. Here are these corollaries47:
i) F =
D2 −BX
D −B ;
ii) X =
BF +D2 −DF
B
;
iii) B =
DF −D2
F −X ;
iv) DF −D2 = BF −BX.
(20)
Of course, it is the first corollary that mainly interests us. If one adopts Vie`te’s formalism
to express the terms of the geometric proportion, and writes “ B
n
Dn−1
” in place of “X”, one gets
from it the following equality:
D +B +
B2
D
+
B3
D2
+ . . .+
Bn
Dn−1
=
D2 − Bn+1
Dn−1
D −B .
Though there is no doubt that Vie`te understood his progression as decreasing (supposing
that B < D), this equality holds for any geometric progression whose ratio differs from unity
(that is, also if D < B). Still, whereas in the second case, as the term X = B
n+1
Dn−1
progressively
increases, the sum F =
D2−Bn+1
Dn−1
D−B becomes infinite with n, in the first case, since the term
X = B
n+1
Dn−1
progressively decreases, when n becomes infinite such a term vanishes and the sum
F =
D2−Bn+1
Dn−1
D−B is then transformed in the finite ratio
D2
D−B . This is just what Vie`te remarked
in the second part of his chapter, and possibly had in his mind when he wrote, unadvisedly,
the first part of his theorem as it appears in the original edition of his treatise.
so that:
D +B +
B2
D
+
B3
D2
+ . . .+
Bn
Dn−1
=
Dn+1 −Bn+1
(D −B)Dn−1 =
D2 −B Bn
Dn−1
D −B .
It is perhaps of some interest to remark that the second of the previous equalities is the fundamental equality
of Sluse’s method of tangents, a method that Sluse was probably elaborating at the beginning of the sixties
and that he exposed, some years later in two letters that were published in the Philosophical Transactions: cf.
[35] and [36].
47Cf.[38], p. 29r, and [39], p. 397. Of course, Vie`te writes “∼ quadratum” or “∼ quadrato” (abridged in
“∼ quad.” in [39]) where we write “∼2” and “∼ in ∼” where we write “∼∼”. This apart, his notation is the
same than ours. In [39] there is a typographical error in the first corollary, since “B quad.” appears in place of
“D quad.”
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Here is what he wrote48:
An vero` cum magnitudines sunt continue` proportionales in infinitum, abibit X in
nihilum. Et evanescere asserent Mechanici, cum minima quantitas subsit tantum
intellectu.
Itaque erit secundum eos. Ut differentia terminorum rationis ad terminum
rationis majorem, ita maxima ad compositam ex omibus.
There is no doubt that Vie`te was arguing that, when the geometric progression proceeds
to infinity, the proportion (17) reduces to
D −B : D = D : F∞, (21)
where F∞ is just the sum of the geometric progression continued to infinity, that is, the
geometric series49, and there is also no doubt that he was admitting that a possible argument
for this claim is that, when the progression proceeds to infinity, X vanishes. If one puts,
indeed, X = 0 and F = F∞, in the proportion (17) and in the equality (20.i), one gets,
respectively:
D : B = F∞ : F∞ −D and F∞ =
D2
D −B ,
which are both equivalent to the proportion (21). It is sufficient to replace F∞, D, and B
with Z, α, and β, to understand that Vie`te has thus provided a proof of the equality (15),
and proved Barrow’s theorem, in the general case where the terms of the geometric series are
any sort of quantity.
But it is also clear that, for Vie`te, this argument did not have the same nature as an
“analytic” one. Rather it was a “mechanical” argument, that is—if I understand well—an
argument based, merely, on successive approximate estimates. Thus, Vie`te considered it
necessary to offer another argument for the same conclusion.
Here is what he wrote, firstly50:
Cum alioquin esset, Ut differentia terminorum rationis ad terminum rationis mi-
norem, ita minima ad crementum.
Et ut differentia terminorum rationis ad terminorum rationis maiorem, ita
maxima ad compositam ex omnibus plus cremento.
According to Dhombres51, the first of these two proportions provides a definition for the
“increment” relative to the last term of the progression, that is, X. The second is, instead, a
48Cf. [38], p. 29r, and [39], p. 398.
49The symbol “F∞” is of course not used by Vie`te. I introduce it for simplicity.
50Cf. [38], p. 29r, and [39], p. 398.
51Cf. [11], p. 152.
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consequence of the equality (20.i), together with this last definition. If the increment ∆X (or
∆n, if one prefers, provided that X =
Bn+1
Dn−1
) is so defined that
D −B : B = X : ∆X , (22)
from the equality (20.i) it follows that
F =
D2
D −B −
BX
D −B =
D2
D −B −∆X (23)
that is:
D −B : D = D : F +∆X ,
according to the second proportion. The proportion (21) follows from this last proportion,
provided that ∆X vanishes withX. This last condition is certainly necessary for the proportion
(22) to hold, in this case. But to rely on it in order to prove the proportion (21) is the same as
relying on the supposition that the proportion (22) continues to hold when X vanishes, and
thus, implicitly, to the supposition that X vanishes when the progression proceeds to infinity.
Hence, if this were Vie`te’s argument, it would be as little “analytic” as the previous one.
But this is not Vie`te’s argument. Here is what he wrote after the passage quoted before52:
Sint magnitudines proportionales in continuaˆ ratione subquadruplaˆ ει
c
ς α´
c
piειρoν,
& sit maxima omnium 3. Composita ex omnibus fiet 4. Neque enim magnitu-
dinibus illis in continuaˆ ratione subquadruplaˆ existentibus quarum maxima est 3
tantula potest addi, quin composita sit major 4. Eoque pertinet quadratio Paraboles
Archimedæa.
This could appear to be an argument by authority. Still, it is not so. Certainly Vie`te
was referring here to a particular result obtained by Archimedes in the Quadrature of the
Parabola, namely to the propositions 23 and 24 of this treatise53. But he was also, and overall,
implicitly suggesting a possible application—or better, a generalization—of Archimedes’ proof
by exhaustion, to the general case of any (decreasing) geometric series.
In the proposition 23 of his treatise, Archimedes had proved a particular case of the equality
(20.i), namely that
A+B + C + . . .+ Y + Z +
1
3
Z =
4
3
A, (24)
where A, B, . . . , Z are any number of magnitudes that are to each other as 4 to 1, that
is, B = 14A, C =
1
4B, . . . , Z =
1
4Y . Archimedes’ proof is quite different from the previous
52Cf. [38], p. 29r, and [39], p. 398.
53For short, I adopt here Heath’s transcription of Archimedes’ results and arguments: cf. [1], pp. 249-252.
For the Greek text and its translation in Latin and French, cf. [3], vol. II, pp. 310-315 and [2], vol. II, pp.
192-195.
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one based on the propositions V.12 and VII.12 of the Elements. Though finitary, of course,
it is rather similar, in spirit, to the arithmetical version of Barrow’s proof, which I have
reconstructed above. Suppose that b = 13B, c =
1
3C, . . . , z =
1
3Z, so that
B + b =
1
3
A, C + c =
1
3
B, . . . Z + z =
1
3
Y ;
it follows that
B + C + . . .+ Y + Z + b+ c+ . . .+ y + z =
1
3
(A+B + . . .+ Y )
and
b+ c+ . . .+ y =
1
3
(B + C + . . .+ Y ) ,
and thus, by subtraction:
B + C + . . .+ Y + Z + z =
1
3
A,
which is equivalent to the equality (24).
This last equality provides a lemma for Archimedes’ proof of the proposition 24. There,
Archimedes considers a sequence of triangles, A, B, . . . , Y , Z so constructed inside a segment
of a parabola (the figure delimited by the parabola itself and any one of its chords, parallel
to the tangent at its vertex) that B = 14A, C =
1
4B, . . . , Z =
1
4Y , and such that their
sum continuously approaches such a segment from below. He proves, then, by exhaustion,
that the segment of parabola is to the first of these triangles as 4 to 3, that is, it is equal
to 43A. The proof goes as follows. Suppose that the segment of parabola, let us say Π
54, is
greater than 43A. It would then be possible to take so many triangles A, B, . . . , Z so that
the difference Π− 43A+ 13Z between the segment of parabola and their sum becomes smaller
than the difference between Π and 43A, which is impossible since, whatever Z may be, the
inequality
Π− 4
3
A+
1
3
Z > Π− 4
3
A.
holds true. Suppose, then, that Π is smaller than 43A. It would then be possible to take so
many triangles A, B, . . . , Z so that Z—and thus, a fortiori, 13Z—becomes smaller than the
difference between 43A and Π, which is impossible since from
1
3Z <
4
3A−Π, it follows that
A+B + . . .+ Z =
4
3
A− 1
3
Z > Π,
against the supposition that the sum A+B + . . .+ Z approaches Π from below.
54The symbol “Π” does not appear in Archimedes’ text. I introduce it for simplicity.
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Supposing that in the equality (23), one replaces D with A, B with 14A and X with Z,
one gets:
F =
A2
A− 14A
−
1
4AZ
A− 14A
=
4
3
A− 1
3
Z =
4
3
A−∆Z .
Archimedes’ equality (24) is thus consistent with Vie`te’s equalities (20.i) and (23), and the
term 13Z which appears in the first of these equalities is nothing but the particular value of
∆X for
D
B
= 14 and X = Z.
It is thus quite natural to understand Vie`te’s mention of Archimedes’ result as a sketch
of a possible generalization of Archimedes’ proof by exhaustion. This would simply work as
follows. Suppose that, when the progression proceeds to infinity, its sum F∞ is greater than
D2
D−B . As
B
D−B is constant and ∆X =
B
D−BX, it would then be possible to take so many terms
D, B, . . . , X so that the difference F∞− D
2
D−B +∆X between the total sum F∞ and the partial
sum F = D
2
D−B −∆X is smaller than the difference between F∞ and D
2
D−B , which is impossible
since, whatever ∆X may be, the inequality
F∞ −
D2
D −B +∆X > F∞ −
D2
D −B .
holds true. Suppose, then, that F∞ is smaller than D
2
D−B . It would then be possible—again,
since B
D−B is constant and ∆X =
B
D−BX—to take so many terms D, B, . . . , X so that
∆X is smaller than the difference between
D2
D−B and F∞, which is impossible since from
∆X <
D2
D−B − F∞, it follows that
D +B + . . .+X = F =
D2
D −B −∆X > F∞.
against the supposition that the series A+B + . . .+ Z is decreasing.
Though Archimedes’ proof by exhaustion is certainly geometric, the generalization of it
that Vie`te seems to suggest is not, since it simply relies on the relations between the terms
of any geometric series and is based on the equality (23) that is proved, both by Vie`te and
Archimedes, without relying on any geometric argument.
Now, the relevant question is: is this second proof advanced by Vie`te essentially different
from the first—mechanical—one? From our point of view it seems to be so, since it seems to
be a rudimentary version of a ε-δ argument. But our point of view could not have been that
of Vie`te: whereas we see in this proof the announcement of something that will come later,
Vie`te could only see a tentative generalization of a particular proof by exhaustion, concerning
a particular geometric construction. So it is far from sure that Vie`te could have seen what, to
us, makes the crucial difference between his first and his second argument. And the conclusive
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phrase of his chapter confirms that he had some doubts about the fact that, unlike the former,
the latter was “analytic”55:
Sed vix adsentientur Platonici, cum ipsa omnis Geometria sit intellectu.
Still, this is not a reason to conclude that Barrow could have had some reason to claim
that, once restricted to the case where the terms of the geometric series are numbers, Vie`te’s
proofs are not purely arithmetic. If one had argued that it is so for this proof is infinitary,
one should also have maintained that, for the very same reason, Barrow’s theorem itself is
not arithmetic. But it is hard to think that Barrow would have advanced a similar argument.
The quite schematic proof that he offers for the equality (15), in the footnote we have quoted
before is, indeed, nothing but a sketch of the first of Vie`te’s proofs, since the proportion
Z − o : Z − α : : α : β
is, manifestly, a rewriting of Vie`te’s proportion (17) with o in place of X56. On the other hand,
it would have been quite hard to argue that, from a mathematical point of view, Vie`te’s proofs
are less simple, clear, compact and elegant than Barrow’s one. If I have taken so much time
to reconstruct them, it is, merely, because I have tried to make manifest their classical—that
is, Euclidean and Archimedean—sources. And certainly Barrow would have not considered
the classical argument I have mentioned as less virtuous than his own57.
Then, where could Barrow have seen the advantages of his own proof over Vie`te’s? The only
possible answer that I see is that he could have maintained that the Achilles paradox model
supplied Vie`te’s implicit generalization of Archimedes’ particular proof of the proposition 24
of the Quadrature of the Parabola with, so to speak, a concrete framework, similar to that
which the segment of parabola and the sequence of triangles constructed inside it supplies
Archimedes’ proof with. But the need for a similar framework only arises if the sort of infinity
involved both in Vie`te’s first proof and in his implicit generalization of Archimedes’ proof is
seen with suspicion. And one can take this need to be satisfied by the Achilles paradox model
only if one considers that the sort of infinity involved in this model is essentially different than
the first one.
Thus, we come back to a similar conclusion as that we had reached in section 3.2: the only
reason that Barrow could have had to prefer his own proof over Vie`te’s is the same as the only
one he could have relied on in order to maintain that his proof is essentially geometric. This
55Cf. [38], p. 29r, and [39], p. 398. Remember that Vie`te was agreeing with a traditional belief, quite
widespread in his times, according to which the origins of analysis, as an argumentative form, went back to
Plato: cf. [37], p. 4.
56Notice the symbol “o”, probably used so as to allude to the fact that the quantity so denoted is vanishing
(unfortunately, in [8], p. 48, this symbol is replaced with “0”).
57A proof of that, if it were necessary, is that Archimedes’ quadrature of the parabola is just the crucial
result on which Barrow’s proof of his first theorem is founded.
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reason would have just been the following: only the Achilles paradox model, or some similar
geometric models, could license the sort of infinitary argument involved both in the arithmetic
proofs expounded in section 3.2 and in Vie`te’s.
Mutatis mutandis, this is the same philosophical point that Barrow’s first example seems
to be concerned with: where potential infinity by division is legitimate, actual infinity by
addition is not, or better, the latter becomes legitimate only if a model for it is provided, with
respect to which it appears to be merely an expression of a potential infinity by division. This
last point is explicitly made by Barrow himself, with reference to arithmetical series, in his
ninth lecture58:
Nay it is plainly taught and demonstrated by Arithmeticians, that an infinite Se-
ries of Fractions decreasing in a certain Proportion, is equal to a certain Number,
or to Unite [sic], or to a part of an Unity; ex. gr. that such a Series of Fractions
decreasing in a subsesquialter Proportion is equal to Two, in subduble Proportion
to Unity, in a subtriple to one half ; from whence it is not inconsistent for some-
thing finite to contain in it an Infinity of Parts; especially since nothing agrees
with Number, which does not with more right with Magnitude, which Number
represents and denominates.
As Barrow’s reference to arithmeticians reveals, the opposition between this potential concep-
tion of infinity and an actual one has nothing to do, as such, with the subsumption of the
domain of arithmetic under that of geometry.
3.4 Two last proofs
My argument could proceed further, by mentioning several other non explicitly geometric
proofs of Barrow’s theorem that, though possibly not known to him in 1664, became so later,
or would have been easily understood by him. I shall limit myself to two of them.
The first one—of which Barrow certainly became aware in the second half of the sixties—
depends on the so-called “method of division of Mercator”. This name depends on the fact
that the first printed source where it is exposed is Mercator’s Logarithmotechnia, published
in 166859. Still, Newton used it, in 1664 and 1665, in the context of his own reformulation of
Wallis’ method of quadrature60.
The proposition 2 included in a note that Newton wrote in Cambridge, in the winter 1664-
1665, after his second reading of Wallis’s Arithmetica infinitorm61, consists of the following
equality:
aa
b+ x
=
aa
b
− aax
bb
+
aaxx
b3
− aax
3
b4
+
aax4
b5
− aax
5
b6
+
aax6
b7
+&c. (25)
58Cf. [7], p. 157.
59Cf. [25], par. XV, pp. 29-30.
60Cf. [28], ch. 4.
61Cf. [27], vol. 1, 1, 3, § 4, [2], pp. 126-134, specially p. 127.
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This is the first statement of a particular case of what would become, quite soon, Newton’s
binomial theorem. The proof of this equality offered by Newton on such an occasion cannot
be reconstructed here. I shall limit myself to remark that it is far from being plain, simple and
compact, and is based on a quite conjectural extension of Pascal’s triangle or Wallis’s table
of figurate numbers. Still, Newton comes back to this matter a few months later, presumably
at the end of summer 1665, in a sketch of a treatise on quadratures and series expansions62,
whose propositions 7 and 8 consist of the following equalities:
a+ b
}m
n = a
m
n +
m
n
× b
a
× amn + m
n
× m− n
2n
× bb
aa
× amn +
+
m
n
× m− n
2n
× m− 2n
3n
× b
3
a3
× amn . &c.;
1
a+ b
}m
n
=
1
a
m
n
− m
n
× b
a
× 1
a
m
n
− m
n
× −m− n
2n
× bb
aa
× 1
a
m
n
+
−m
n
× −m− n
2n
× −m− 2n
3n
× b
3
a3
× 1
a
m
n
. &c.
These equalities represent the first general statement of the binomial theorem63. Among other
arguments that Newton offers for justifying them—including a quite complex one based, once
again, on Pascal’s triangle or Wallis’s table of figurate numbers—we find the following64:
The truth of these two prop: is also thus demonstrated. If a+ b
}−1
1 = 1
a+b I divide
1 by a + b as in decimall fractions & find the quote 1
a
− b
aa
+ bb
a3
− b3
a4
+ b
4
a5
&c. as
appeareth also by multiplying both parts by a+ b. So I extract the rote of a2 + b
as if they were decimall numbers & find
√
a2 + b = a+ b2a − bb8a3 + b
3
16a5
&c, as also
may appear by squareing both parts.
We are, of course, interested in the first of these arguments, specially concerned with the
first of the previous equalities. It just relies on Mercator’s method. Its idea is simple: just
apply to the binomial a+ b the usual method to divide 1 by any other number expressed as a
sum of two numbers; first, divide 1 by a, multiply the result for a+b and subtract the product
from 1, so to get the first remainder, then operate on this remainder as on 1, and continue in
this way as far as you like. If one note by “Ai” and “Ri” (i = 1, 2, . . .) the successive terms of
the development of 1
a+b and the respective remainders, and take R1 to be 1, one easily gets:
Ai =
Ri
a
and Ri+1 = Ri −Ai (a+ b) ,
62Cf. [27], vol. 1, 2, 5, § 1, [6], pp. 318-321, specially p. 321.
63Cf. [27], vol. 1, p. 321, note (111).
64Cf. [27], vol. 1, 2, 5, § 1, [6], p. 321.
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that is
A1 =
R1
a
=
1
a
; R2 = R1 −A1 (a+ b) = −
b
a
A2 =
R2
a
= − b
a2
; R3 = R2 −A2 (a+ b) =
b2
a2
A3 =
R3
a
=
b2
a3
; R4 = R3 −A3 (a+ b) = −
b3
a3
. . . . . .
An =
Rn
a
= −(−)n b
n−1
an
; Rn+1 = (−)n
bn
an
. . . . . . ,
or
1
a+ b
=
1
a
− b
a2
+
b2
a3
− . . .− (−)i b
i−1
ai
+ . . . (26)
To get the equality (25) it is then enough to operate appropriate substitutions and multipli-
cations. In the same way, by replacing, in the equality (26), a with α and b with −β, then by
multiplying for α2, one gets the equality (8), that is thus proved through an argument whose
arithmetical origins are evident.
If Barrow did not know this argument in 1664, he certainly became aware of it later on,
since Newton exposed it, in a quite general form, in the De analysi65, a text that Barrow
himself sent to Collins on July 31st, 166966.
Another possible, non explicitly geometric, proof of Barrow’s theorem could be done by
relying on the so-called method of indeterminate coefficients. This method was exposed, in its
finitary form, in Descartes’ Geometry67, where it was used to solve the problem of tangents.
Later on, and especially after its massive use by Newton, the infinitary version of this method
became a crucial tool of the analysis. Such a method can be quite easily applied to the problem
of looking for the sum of α
2
α−β . Suppose that:
α2
α− β = A+Bβ + Cβ
2 +Dβ3 + . . . ,
where A, B, C, D, . . . are indeterminate coefficients to be determined. Then
α2 =
(
A+Bβ + Cβ2 +Dβ3 + . . .
)
(α− β)
= Aα+Bαβ + Cαβ2 +Dαβ3 + . . .−Aβ −Bβ2 − Cβ3 −Dβ4 − . . . ,
and thus, by separately equating the coefficients of the successive powers of β to zero:
65Cf. [27], vol. II, 2, 3, pp. 212-214.
66Cf. [26], vol. I, p. 14 and [27], vol. II, 2, Introduction, note (11), p. 166.
67Cf. [10], p. 347.
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α2 −Aα = 0 → A = α,
A−Bα = 0 → B = A
α
= 1,
B − C α = 0 → C = B
α
= 1
α
,
C −Dα = 0 → D = C
α
= 1
α2
,
. . . . . . ,
according to the equality (15).
Both these proofs have a double disadvantage compared with on Vie`te’s and Barrow’s:
they require a previous conjecture about the sum of the geometric series, that is, they have no
heuristic power; and they do not provide any argument for warranting the infinite reiteration
of the procedure on which they depend. The second one supposes, moreover, that the ratio
α2
α−β has a unique expansion in a power series and that this power series can be manipulated
term by term. If Barrow had known them when he gave his Mathematical Lectures, he could
have advanced these reasons to prefer his own proof to them. But, if so, he would have
implicitly opposed an ideal of perspicuity of mathematical arguments to an ideal of extension
of mathematical techniques, rather than showing any reason for the domain of arithmetic to
be subsumed under that of geometry.
4 Conclusions
The consideration of Barrow’s examples should show that, when compared with the actual
state of mathematical research in the middle of the 17th century, his opposition of geometry
and arithmetic is out of place. These examples could have only been used in order to support
the thesis according to which only a geometrical interpretation of infitary arguments would
be able to license these same arguments, since, as Aristotle had already argued, the only
legitimate sort of infinity would be the infinity of the division of an already given magnitude.
Still, the second example, namely the proof that Barrow offered for the theorem with which
this example is concerned, possibly had an unexpected influence on the evolution of geometry.
In a note he wrote at the time of his priority quarrel with Leibniz, probably in 1714, Newton
claimed that “Dr Barrows Lectures might put [. . . ][him] upon considering the generation of
figures by motion68”. Though he immediately added that he was not able to remember it
exactly, this statement should be enough to attest that Newton followed at least some of
Barrow’s Mathematical Lectures, namely the parts of them dealing with a kinematic approach
to geometry, and thus, quite probably, the lecture where Barrow exposed his second example.
68Cf. [27], vol. 1, 2, 5, § 4, footnote (4), p. 344. Cf. also: ibid., vol. 1, 2, Introduction, App. 1, p. 150.
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It is thus possible to conjecture that this example had some influence on the development of
Newton’s ideas about geometry. This is in any case what Hofmann has suggested69.
In my view, a crucial idea that Newton could have drawn from Barrow’s proof is that of
associating to a pair of segments, supposed to be generated in equal time by a moving point,
the ratio of the speeds of the generating motions. This is more than merely admitting that a
segment is generated through motion, which was quite a widespread conception in the middle
of the 17th century. It rather entails that the speed of this motion is an essential feature to
be considered in geometry. This is no more a philosophical option. It is rather a view on the
intrinsic mathematical nature of geometric objects and their relations that constituted one of
the crucial elements on which Newton’s theory of fluxions was founded.
5 Annex 1: An arithmetical proof of Barrow’s first theorem
through a result of Ramanujan
Ramanujan’s result is the following:
n∑
i=1
√
i = C +
[
2
3
n+
1
2
]√
n+
1
6
∞∑
j=0
[√
n+ j +
√
n+ j + 1
]−3
, (27)
where C is an appropriate constant.
To prove it, Ramanujan relies on the definition of the following function φ : N+→ R:
φ (n) =
n∑
i=1
√
i−
(
C +
2
3
n
√
n+
1
2
√
n
)
− 1
6
∞∑
j=0
[√
n+ j +
√
n+ j + 1
]−3
, (28)
where C is such that
φ (1) = 1− C − 2
3
− 1
2
− 1
6
∞∑
j=0
[√
1 + j +
√
2 + j
]−3
= 0. (29)
This is a finite constant, since
∞∑
j=0
[√
1 + j +
√
2 + j
]−3
converges.
69Cf. [16], p. 115. Notice however that Whiteside has remarked that Newton could have also drawn his ideas
about the generation of geometric objects by motion from some other sources [cf. [27], vol. 1, 2, 5, § 4, footnote
(4), p. 344]. Possibly, Newton’s sources were many, but Barrow’s example was probably one of them.
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Once the function (28) is defined, the proof reduces to a quite easy calculation that Barrow
could have performed himself. Thus, its difficulty consists in imagining of the appropriate form
of the function φ (n): only the extraordinary numerical sense of someone like Ramanujan could
have had this insight.
The first step in this calculation is the establishment of the following equality:
φ (n)−φ (n+ 1) = −
√
n+ 1+
2
3
[
(n+ 1)
√
n+ 1− n√n
]
+
1
2
[√
n+ 1−√n
]
+
1
6
[√
n−
√
n+ 1
]3
.
(30)
This is an immediate consequence of the other equality
1
(a+ b)ν
=
(a− b)ν
(a2 − b2)ν ,
that holds for any ν, a and b. It is enough, indeed, to put ν = 3, a =
√
n and b =
√
n+ 1, for
getting:
1(√
n+
√
n+ 1
)3 = − (√n−√n+ 1)3 . (31)
From (30), it is then easy to draw, by a simple calculation, that
φ (n)− φ (n+ 1) = 0.
And, as φ (1) = 0, this entails that φ (n) = 0, for any (positive natural) n, which is equivalent
to the equality (1)70.
Once this last equality is admitted, to prove Barrow’s first theorem it is enough to remark
that from it and the other equality (31), it follows that
n∑
i=1
√
i
(n+ 1)
√
n
=
C
(n+ 1)
√
n
+
4n+ 3
6 (n+ 1)
− 1
6
∞∑
j=0
[√
n+ j −√n+ j + 1
]3
(n+ 1)
√
n
70Let us note that from (29) and (31), it follows that:
C = −1
6
"
1−
∞X
j=0
hp
1 + j −
p
2 + j
i3#
= −1
6
»
1−
h√
1−
√
2
i3
−
h√
2−
√
3
i3
−
h√
3−
√
4
i3
− . . .
–
= −1
6
h
1−
h
7− 5
√
2
i
−
h
11
√
2− 9
√
3
i
−
h
15
√
3− 13
√
4
i
− . . .
i
= 1 +
√
2 +
√
3 + . . .+
√
n− 1 + 4n
6
√
n+ 1 + . . .
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and thus71:
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
√
i
(n+ 1)
√
n
= lim
n→∞

 C
(n+ 1)
√
n
+
4n+ 3
6 (n+ 1)
− 1
6
∞∑
j=0
[√
n+ j −√n+ j + 1
]3
(n+ 1)
√
n


= lim
n→∞
C
(n+ 1)
√
n
+ lim
n→∞
4n+ 3
6 (n+ 1)
−
∞∑
j=0
lim
n→∞
[√
n+ j −√n+ j + 1
]3
6 (n+ 1)
√
n
= 0 +
2
3
− 0− 0− 0− . . . = 2
3
.
6 Annex 2: A proof of Barrow’s first theorem through inte-
gration
According to the Cauchy-Riemann definition of a definite integral, one gets:
lim
ε→0
n∑
i=1
ε
√
iε =
∫ 1
0
√
xdx.
If one supposes that ε = 1
n
, it follows that
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
1
n
√
i
n
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
√
i
n
√
n
=
∫ 1
0
√
xdx.
As
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
√
i
n
√
n
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
√
i
n
√
n
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
√
i
(n+ 1)
√
n
,
this is the same as:
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
√
i
(n+ 1)
√
n
=
∫ 1
0
√
xdx.
71From the binomial theorem it follows, for any natural j, thatˆ√
n+ j −√n+ j + 1˜3
(n+ 1)
√
n
=
[4n+ 4j + 3]
√
n+ j − [4n+ 4j + 1]√n+ j + 1
(n+ 1)
√
n
=
[4n+ 4j + 3]
∞P
i=0
„
1/2
i
«
(
√
n)
1−2i
ji − [4n+ 4j + 1]
∞P
i=0
„
1/2
i
«
(
√
n)
1−2i
(j + 1)i
(n+ 1)
√
n
and so:
lim
n→∞
ˆ√
n+ j −√n+ j + 1˜3
(n+ 1)
√
n
= lim
n→∞
2
√
n
(n+ 1)
√
n
= lim
n→∞
2
n+ 1
= 0.
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To prove the equality (1), it is thus enough to remark that
∫ 1
0
√
xdx =
2
3
[
x
3
2
]1
0
=
2
3
.
Notice that the limits lim
ε→0
n∑
i=1
ε
√
iε, lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
1
n
√
i
n
, lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
√
i
n
√
n
, and lim
n→∞
n∑
i=0
√
i
(n+1)
√
n
that
enter this argument are essentially different from the limit lim
n→∞
C
(n+1)
√
n
, lim
n→∞
4n+3
6(n+1) , and
lim
n→∞
1
6
∞∑
j=0
[
√
n+j−√n+j+1]3
(n+1)
√
n
that enter Ramanujan’s argument, since the former cannot commute
with
∑
. In the former, this last operator refers, indeed, to the same variable as the limit
operator or to a function of this variable. This is a typical feature of the Cauchy-Riemann
integral, and it is because of it that the argument based on such an integral is not purely
arithmetic, while Ramanujan’s one is so.
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